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The Reason of the Common Law
BARBARA A. SINGER*
Although the present meaning of reason has been reduced
to discrete definitions, precise interpretations did not exist in
medieval England. Rather, reason was defined by its role in the
adjudicatory process. During the late medieval period, reason
came to embody the very essence of the common law as courts
recognized that it could be used to prevent procedural rules
from infringing upon substantive rights. Relying upon Year
Book cases and jurisprudential works, the author describes how
the chameleon-like character of reason helped to shape the me-
dieval English common law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"For nothing in the world speaks so reasonably as the Law." -
Chief Justice Fyneux, commenting upon the English common
law.1
The word "reason" means many things to many people.' It can
mean a simple cause,3 the process by which an argument is devel-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
1. Y.B. Pasch. 13 Hen. 7, f. 22, pl. 19 (1498).
2. The OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933 ed.) devotes nearly five pages to "reason"
and derivative words such as reasoning and reasonable.
3. 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 212 (J. Murray ed. 1933) (sixth definition of reason).
That reason can mean a simple cause is evident in this passage from a mid-fifteenth-century
English case:
John of Gaunt and Alice, his wife, were seised of the Duchy of Lancaster in
Alice's right and of the honor of Bolingbroke in the county of Lincoln, which was
parcel of said Duchy, of which honor the manor of Spalding (by reason of which
the plaintiff claims this stray) was held in pure and perpetual aims.
Y.B. Trin. 7 Edw. 4, f. 10, pl. 2 (1467); see, e.g., Y.B. Mich. 22 Hen. 6, f. 33, pl. 51 (1443);
Y.B. Mich. 22 Hen. 6, f. 28, pl. 47 [listed as 421 (1443).
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oped, 4 or even a fully developed argument that is used as proof 5
Although reason conveyed these and other meanings to the lawyers
of the medieval common law,6 it also assumed a broader signifi-
cance for these men. As Chief Justice Fortescue explained, "com-
mon reason is the common law."'7
Unfortunately, as with so many of the complex conceptions
that populate the Year Books, the lawyers who so often used "rea-
son" never defined it. Jurisprudential works of the period, how-
ever, can provide guidance to the meaning of "reason." But one
always must remember that these works concern themselves with
what the law (and the role of reason in it) should be, and not with
what it actually was, as practiced in the courts of the common law.
Therefore, one must look to the legal dialogues recorded in the
Year Books to ascertain the contours of medieval common-law
reason.
When Henry Tudor ascended the English throne in 1485,
three centuries of constant refinement had brought the common
law of the central courts to a highly polished-and as yet unchal-
lenged-eminence. The common law, however, was not destined to
retain its medieval form for much longer. The War of Roses,'
which directly preceded the rise of Henry Bolingbroke, already had
prompted one of its victims, Sir John Fortescue,9 to ponder in exile
the bases of the English political and legal orders. With the dawn
of the English Reformation several decades later came a serious
challenge to the very legitimacy of the common-law system. Thus,
the years of Henry VI, Edward IV, Richard III, and Henry VII
offer a final glimpse of the culmination of the medieval common
4. 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 213 (nineteenth definition of rea-
son). Reason can also mean an argument: "And before [Yelverton] had finished his reason,
the justices got up." Y.B. Mich. 8 Edw. 4, f. 9, pl. 9 at f. 13 (1468).
5. 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 211 (first definition of reason). Rea-
son can constitute proof: "And divers good reasons and cases were put by the justices and
serjeants." Y.B. Mich. 3 Edw. 4, f. 19, pl. 13 (1463).
6. For further uses, see, e.g., Y.B. Pasch. 5 Edw. 4, f. 26, pl. 24 at f. 27 (Long Quinto)
(1465) ("The parker is bound to guard [the wild animals in a park] reasonably."); Y.B. Hil.
22 Hen. 6, f. 42, pl. 21 (1444) ("Rose, who was the wife of J.W. brought a writ of dower
against W.D. and demanded her reasonable dower.").
7. Y.B. Hil. 35 Hen. 6, f. 52, pl. 17 at f. 53 (1457); see also Y.B. Mich. 14 Hen. 8, f. 4, pl.
5 at f. 8 (1521) (per Brooke).
8. The War of Roses (1455-1485) is the name given to a series of struggles between the
Houses of Lancaster (the white rose) and York (the red rose) for possession of the English
throne. Lancaster ultimately triumphed when Henry Tudor defeated Richard III on the
Field of Bosworth and claimed the throne as Henry VII.
9. Fortescue was one-time Chief Justice of the King's Bench and Chancellor of
England.
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law. Using late medieval Year Book cases and English jurispruden-
tial works of the same period, 0 this article will attempt to paint a
portrait of the role of reason in the medieval English common law.
II. THE THEORY OF NATURAL LAW
A. The English View of Natural Law
Medieval western religion taught that the Christian God cre-
ated the world and everything in it. The human race was of special
importance to God because He had endowed it with the ability to
think. This rational faculty, which St. Thomas Aquinas (c.1225-
1274) alternately labeled natural law or natural reason, was "noth-
ing other than the sharing in the Eternal Law by intelligent crea-
tures."'1 Human laws, it followed, were the dictate of this reason,
or natural law,'2 promulgated to preserve God's universal order.'3
Medieval English jurisprudists incorporated Aquinas's equa-
tion of reason with natural law into their own theoretical schemes.
For example, Christopher St. German (c.1469-1539) entitled the
second chapter of the first Dialogue in his Doctor and Student, "of
the lawe of reason, the whyche by Doctoris is called the lawe of
nature of reasonable creature."' 4 Sir John Fortescue (c.1385-1479)
also paid homage to both St. Thomas Aquinas and his natural-law
views in both his De Laudibus Legum Anglie' e and De Natura
Legis Naturae,6 calling the law of nature a universal rule of divine
10. Along with Sir Thomas Littleton, Sir John Fortescue, and Christopher St. German,
who are legitimately of the period under examination, consideration also will be given to
other English jurisprudists such as Richard Hooker and Sir Edward Coke, who, though writ-
ing at a later time, nevertheless shed valuable light on the medieval English mode of
thought.
The views of non-English jurisprudists such as St. Thomas Aquinas, however, will re-
ceive little overt attention. While the impact of St. Thomas Aquinas upon the works of all
the afore-mentioned Englishmen was substantial, he developed his ideas in the context of a
civil law, not a common law system. Therefore, his works do not have the same direct bear-
ing on the actual practice of the English courts as do the common-law theorists.
For a comprehensive survey of Western philosophical and jurisprudential thought dur-
ing the Middle Ages, see C. MCILWAIN, THE GROWTH OF POLmCAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST
(1932).
11. 28 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 23 (T. Gilby ed. 1966) (quest. 91, art.
2).
12. Id. at 25 (quest. 91, art. 3).
13. Id. at 13 (quest. 90, art. 3).
14. 91 SELDEN SocIETY, DOCTOR AND STUDENT 13 (T. Plucknett & J. Barton eds. 1974).
15. J. FORTESCUE, DE LAUDmus LEGUM ANGLIE 39 (S. Chrimes ed. 1942) [hereinafter
cited as J. FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS].
16. J. FoRTEscuE, DE NATURA LEGIS NATURtAE 200 (Garland series 1980) [hereinafter
cited as J. FoRTEscuE, DE NATURA].
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and perpetual quality, which is "the mother of all human laws." 17
Although Sir Thomas Littleton (d. 1481) did not choose to address
the subject of natural law in his Tenures, Sir Edward Coke (1552-
1634), commenting upon Littleton's treatise, identified "nature, or
the course of nature" as one of the fountains from which Littleton
drew his ideas.18
But as medieval scholars were well aware, the common-law
courts "paid even less attention"1' to natural law than did their
civilian counterparts. The same Fortescue who praised the divine
quality of the natural law, never once invoked the law of nature in
any of his recorded Year Book remarks. Neither did Littleton, the
other legal giant of mid-fifteenth-century England, call upon the
law of nature in any of his countless court appearances. Natural
law did, however, make an occasional-and thereby notewor-
thy-appearance in the Year Books of the late medieval period.
Perhaps the most famous of these occasions is a 1468 comment by
Sir William Yelverton:20 "We ought to do now in this case as the
canonists and civilians do when a new case occurs for which they
have previously had no law: they resort to the law of nature, which
is the basis of all laws. .. .
Taken by itself, Yelverton's remark forcefully argues for the
natural-law proponents. But when viewed in the context in which
it was made, this declaration assumes a new meaning. Yelverton
proffers these comments nearly two-thirds of the way into a
lengthy report, 2 and only after a protracted argument in classic
common-law fashion had failed to resolve the question in dispute:
Whether a defendant, in debt on an obligation conditioned to se-
cure performance of an arbitration award, could plead supervening
17. Id.
18. 1 E. COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND (London
1628) (rev. ed. 1979).
19. 8 SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECT PASSAGES FROM THE WORKS OF BRACTON AND Azo 125 (F.
Maitland ed. 1895).
20. Sir William Yelverton served as parliamentary representative, sergeant at law, and
finally, judge on the King's Bench.
21. Y.B. Mich. 8 Edw. 4, f. 9, pl. 9 at f. 12 (1468). See also Y.B. Trin. 12 Hen. 8, f. 2, pl.
2 (1520), in which Pollard declared that "our law is founded on the law of God"; Y.B. Mich.
20 Hen. 7, f. 10, pl. 20 at f. 11 (1504), in which the court claimed that "the elder brother is
bound by the law of nature to aid and comfort his younger brother"; Y.B. Pasch. 34 Hen. 6,
f. 38, pl. 9 at f. 40 (1456), in which Prisot explained that "We must give credence to such
laws of the church as are in ancient scripture, for this is a common law upon which all
manner of laws are founded."
22. The entire report spans three separate entries-Y.B. Mich. 8 Edw. 4, f. 20, pl. 35
(1468); Y.B. Mich. 8 Edw. 4, f. 9, pl. 9 (1468); Y.B. Pasch. 8 Edw. 4, f. 1, pl. 1 (1468)-and
nearly seven full folios.
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impossibility as a defense to nonperformance of the condition. Be-
cause the normal method of resolution had proved thus far ineffec-
tive, Yelverton suggested that they try a new and different ap-
proach, one followed by the men of the civil law. Thus, even in
Yelverton's mind, a direct appeal to the law of nature was not the
normal course of the common-law courts.
That common-law lawyers were familiar with natural law, but
saw it primarily as operating in some other legal system, is illus-
trated further by a 1473 case heard by the King's Council sitting in
the Star Chamber.23 In that case, a bailor sued an alien merchant,
charging him with feloniously taking and converting to his own
goods he held as a bailee. The Chancellor, in considering how
aliens should be tried, remarked that "even though they have en-
tered the realm, and the King thereby has jurisdiction over them
to make them keep the law, it will be according to the law of na-
ture, which is called by some the law merchant [and] which is a
universal law throughout the world. ' 24 The law of nature, or the
"old law," as the Chancellor called it, did make its presence di-
rectly known in England, but through the mechanism of the law
merchant as practiced in the Admiralty and the fair courts, not by
means of the common law as practiced in the King's Bench and
the Common Pleas.
The law of nature also touched Englishmen whenever the
Chancellor exercised his equity powers. Chancellor Moreton, for
example, believed that regardless of what the law might be in the
common-law courts, in his court the law "is, or of right ought to be,
according to the law of God."2 5 Indeed, Chancery was acutely
aware that not all English law partook of the qualities of the law of
nature .2 According to Chancellor Stillington, "there are two man-
23. Y.B. Pasch. 13 Edw. 4, f. 9, pl. 5 (1473). The case probably was heard while Robert
Stillington, Bishop of Bath and Wells, was Chancellor. His tenure stretched from June 20,
1467 to June 8, 1473. Stillington was a doctor of civil and canon law and reputedly, one of
the leading civilians of his period. See N. PRONAY, The Chancellor, the Chancery, and the
Council, in BRMSH GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 91 (H. Mearder & H. Loyn eds. 1974)
(essays presented to S. B. Chrimes).
24. Y.B. Pasch. 13 Edw. 4, f. 9, pl. 5 (1473).
25. Y.B. Hil. 4 Hen. 7, f. 4, pl. 8 at f. 5 (1489). See also Y.B. Pasch. 8 Edw. 4, f. 4, pl. 11
(1468), in which the Chancellor declared, "He will have a remedy in this court, for God is
the procurator of the future." Dr. Paul Brand suggests that this may be a misquotation. The
Latin actually may have been "protector fatuorum," which translates as "protector of
fools."
26. Natural law may not have even governed the entire jurisdiction of Chancery. In a
1468 case concerning a subpoena issued against three executors, the Chancellor remarked,
"In an attachment I have two powers, one as a temporal judge and the other as a judge of
1983]
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ners of powers and processes: namely, ordinate power and absolute
power. Ordinate is where a certain order is observed, as in positive
law. But the law of nature does not have a certain order; rather, [it
operates] by whatever means that the truth can be known. '2 7 Mis-
pleading and defect of form were not prejudicial in Chancery be-
cause the Chancellor could exercise absolute power.28 This made it
possible for no one to leave the Chancellor's court without a
remedy.2
The law of nature, then, was no stranger to English common
lawyers. As Christians they no doubt believed in the omnipotence
of God. Furthermore, they saw that natural law operated regularly
in the civil law, the law merchant, and the court of Chancery. But
these lawyers did not view natural law as an essential element of
their own common law. A law that had no certain order had no
place in a system in which "formality is the chiefest thing.
80
B. The Omnipotence of Natural Law
In a system where natural law reigns supreme, men cannot
"make" law. They can only declare the laws that God has already
established. 1 Nevertheless, a certain amount of positive law-mak-
ing did occur in the late medieval common-law courts. In 1468 Yel-
verton declared that "if we are to make a positive law on this
point, we ought to see what is the most necessary to the common
weal and make our law accordingly.""2
At the close of the sixteenth century, Richard Hooker (1554-
1600) also maintained that Englishmen were capable of making a
certain type of positive law. 3 Although Hooker undoubtedly for-
conscience." Y.B. Trin. 8 Edw. 4, f. 5, pl. 1 at f. 6 (1468).
27. Y.B. Pasch. 9 Edw. 4, f. 14, pl. 9 (1469).
28. Id.
29. Y.B. Hil. 4 Hen. 7, f. 4, pl. 8 at f. 5 (1489).
30. Y.B. Pasch. 14 Hen. 8, f. 25, pl. 7 at f. 27 (1522) (per Brooke).
31. See J. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION (1955); C. MCIL-
WAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT (1922). But see Arnold, Statutes as Judgments: The
Natural Law Theory of Parliamentary Activity in Medieval England, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
329 (1977).
32. St. German also believed that positive laws must be for the good of the common
weal. 91 SELDEN SOCIETY, DOCTOR AND STUDENT, supra note 14, at 27. Fortescue agreed,
saying that positive laws command what is honest and forbid the contrary. J. FORTESCUE, DE
LAUDIBUS, supra note 15, at 9.
33. R. HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLrrY (1907). St. German also recog-
nized that man was capable of making positive law as long as it did not conflict with the law
of nature. But St. German maintained that those human laws had to be legislative, rather
than judicial in nature. 91 SELDEN SOCIETY, DOCTOR AND STUDENT, supra note 14, at 29. The
lawyers of the common-law courts held differing opinions on this latter point. For example,
(Vol. 37:797
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mulated his argument in response to the expansive legislative pow-
ers exercised by post-Reformation parliaments,u his explanation of
the lawmaking power nevertheless can provide a useful guide to-
ward understanding the medieval view on lawmaking. Hooker saw
two types of human laws: "mixedly" or universal, which affirm a
duty that man always has been bound in conscience to obey, and
"merely" human or local, which create a new duty that is "fit and
convenient." 5 "Mixedly" laws are thus declarative of rights guar-
anteed by natural law; "merely" human laws create limited duties
appropriate to a given time and situation.
Hooker's bifurcated scheme reflected the very essence of the
common-law system. Matters of substance were always left to God
through the mechanism of divinity-invoking modes of proof.3 Yet
matters of procedure were rightly within the authority of the jus-
tices who controlled the central courts. 7
Yelverton's comment now falls into place. He knew that as a
justice of the common pleas, he did not have the power to "create"
substantive laws or substantive rights. He did, however, have the
power to decide precise points before the court. As a corollary to
this latter power, Yelverton had the authority to "make" certain
laws or rules that ensured that the issues before his court were
decided according to a smooth-running, fair procedure.
Rules of procedure (or "merely" human laws), then, were
made for convenience's sake, as Moile explained in a 1459 action of
debt on an obligation.38 When faced with the defendant's request
for a reading of the deed (so that the conditions indorsed on the
back could be made known), Moile declared that "this case often
comes before us, and it is a common case that can touch us all.
Therefore, it is reason that we make a good rule for the mischief of
Ashton believed that positive law could be made either by statute or by usage. Prisot, how-
ever, opined that while judgment and statute could make positive law, usage could not. See
Y.B. Hil. 33 Hen. 6, f. 7, pl. 23 at f. 9 (1455).
34. 94 SELDEN SOCIETY, SPELMAN REPORTS II 43-46 (J. Baker ed. 1978).
35. R. HOOKER, supra note 33, at 193, 196-97.
36. Jurors were charged to decide according to God and conscience. Y.B. Mich. 5 Edw.
4, f. 58, pl. 50 at f. 61 (Long Quinto) (1465). A similar oath bound the defendant who waged
his law.
37. This basic common-law distinction can be traced back at least as far as thirteenth-
century Normandy. According to the Grand Coutumier de Normandie, customs (consue-
tudines) determine "whose anything is, or to what it pertains," while laws (leges) are the
mechanism "by which particular cases are decided." C. MCILwAIN, supra note 10, at 186
(quoting Grand Coutumier).
38. Y.B. Mich. 38 Hen. 6, f. 2, pl. 5 (1459).
19831
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it. ' ' 9
Because rules of procedure were easy to manipulate, some me-
dieval lawyers were tempted to create subsantive laws under the
guise of procedure. To prevent this from happening, common-law
lawyers measured their procedural rules, both established and pro-
posed, by a tool they called "reason." Oftentimes courts relied on
reason to judge the full range of common-law processes, from
opening summons to final execution-and every point in
between."°
St. German explained how the courts applied the measuring
stick of reason to shape common-law rules. Reason, noted the Stu-
dent, is the first of six grounds of the law of England.4 1 This reason
is divided into two degrees; the law of reason primary, and the law
of reason secondary.42 The law of reason primary takes effect
"without the addition . .. of any other law,"' 43 and consists of
commands and prohibitions, such as "that men ought to live
peacefully, and that he who disturbs the peace shall be
punished. '44
The law of reason primary is akin to natural law; the law of
reason secondary, however, is of a somewhat different character. It
is "founded not only upon reason but also upon the ... law or
custom of property, and upon the reason derived from the law of
property"' 45 and is either general-diffused throughout the
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Y.B. Trin. 14 Hen. 7, f. 28, pl. 3 at f. 29 (1499) (execution); Y.B. Mich. 13
Edw. 4, f. 5, pl. 14 (1473) (attaint); Y.B. Pasch. 7 Edw. 4, f. 4, pl. 10 (1467) (sufficiency of
plea); Y.B. Trin. 5 Edw. 4, f. 55, pl. 47 (Long Quinto) (1465) (venue); Y.B. Hil. 33 Hen. 6, f.
7, pl. 23 at f. 8 (1455) (summons); Y.B. Mich. 33 Hen. 6, f. 38, pl. 17 at f. 39 (1454) (plead-
ing); Y.B. Mich. 22 Hen. 6, f. 28, pl. 47 [listed as pl. 42] (1443) (demurrer).
41. 91 SELDEN Sociry, DOCTOR AND STUDENT, supra note 14, at 31. The five other bases
for the law of England include: (1) The law of God, which St. German equated with "the
trewe catholycall faythe," id. at 39-41; (2) Divers general customs, such as coverture, which
are enforced throughout the realm, id. at 45; (3) Maxims, which differ from customs only in
that customs are known throughout the realm, while maxims are known only in the King's
courts by students of the law, id. at 57; (4) Particular customs, such as Gavelkind and Bor-
ough English, which are used only locally, id. at 57; and (5) Statutes, which are
made by our soveraygne lorde the Kings & hys progenytours/and by the lordes
spyrytuell and temporall/and the commons of the whole realm in dyuers Parlya-
ment is in suche cases where the lawe of reason/the laws of God/custom/max-
ymes/ne other groundes of the laws of England semyd not to be suffycyent.
Id. at 73.
42. Id. at 33.
43. Id. (italics deleted).
44. Id. (italics deleted).
45. Id. at 35 (italics deleted).
[Vol. 37:797
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world-or particular-peculiar to one country.4" To demonstrate
how the law of reason secondary particular operated in the courts
of the common law, the Student posed a question to the Doctor
concerning liability for beasts that starve while impounded as
distress:47
STUDENT: There is [a lawe] in Englande/ [which is] a [lawe of]
custome yt yf a man take a dystres for rent service or rent
charge lawfully that he shall put it in a pounde ouerte there to
remayne tyll he be satysfyed of the rent in arrears [that he dys-
treyned for.] And then therupon may be asked this questyon
that yf the [12b] beestes dye in pounde for lacke of meate/ at
whose peryll dye they/ whether dye they at the peryll of hym
that dystreyned or of hym that oweth the beestes. So I should
like to hear your opinion as it seems to you.
DOCTOUR: Yf the lawe be as thou sayste that one may lawfully
take a distress and put it in open pound, and then a man for a
iuste cause takyth a dystres and putteth it in pounde ouerte ac-
cording to law [and no lawe compellyth hym that dystreyneth to
giue them meate/] then it semyth of reason that yf the dystres
dye [in pounde for lacke of meate/] that it dyeth at the peryll of
hym that oweth the beestes & not of hym that dystreyned/ for
in hym that dystreyned there can be assygned noo defaute/ but
in the other may be assynged a defaute bycause the rente was
vnpayde.
STUDENT: [T]hou haste gyuen a trewe Iugement and who hath
taughte the to do so/ but reason dyryuyed of the sayd general
custome4
46. Id.
47. Although the Student posed the question here in substantive terms, had he raised it
in the Common Pleas, it probably would have been in the form of a challenge to the suffi-
ciency of a plea in justification. See infra text accompanying note 48.
48. 91 SELDEN SOCIETY, DOCTOR AND STUDENT, supra note 14, at 35-37. The Student
also posed the following question to the Doctor:
STUDENT: . . . [I]t has been ordained by statute that one who has abjured the
land is under the king's peace while he is on the highway, and is to be in no wise
molested, while according to the custom of the realm one who has thus abjured
shall be conducted from vill to vill by the village constables until he reaches the
sea-port assigned to him by the king's coroner; whence may arise the question
whether if such an abjured person escaped on the way and fled from the consta-
bles, whether they ought to be charged to the king for that escape.
DOCTOR: It seems to be that since the constables under the statute cannot keep
him securely nor employ force or imprisonment for his safe custody, it would not
be reasonable to charge them with the escape.
STUDENT: . . . [T]hou hast judged rightly; and it is clear enough that the reason
founded on the said statute taught thee.
Id. at 37 (italics deleted).
19831
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The "reason" spoken of here is ordinary, inductive logic: the Doc-
tor begins with the premise (the facts), applies the rule (custom),
and "reasons" to an acceptable conclusion.
A 1506 action of replevin reveals a definite parallel between
the Doctor's reasoning and basic common-law reasoning. The de-
fendant avowed the taking by reason of a custom requiring all of
the tenants of his manor of T who took beasts damage feasant to
impound them in the lord's pound. Should they fail to do so, they
would be subject to amercement at the next manor court. The
plaintiff distrained, but put the animals in his own pound. The
court fined him 12d.; the lord then distrained for the amercement.
Kingsmill and Fisher considered whether, on these facts, the plain-
tiff could plead custom. They decided in the negative because the
custom
is against common right and common law. For whenever anyone
finds animals damage feasant on his land, with law and common
reason he can distrain them and impound them wherever he will
on his land. And the lord is not injured by this, nor does he
suffer any loss. Thus, it follows by reason that the distrainor
cannot be compelled to take his distress to the lord's pound.4 9
Once again, the medieval common-law jurisprudists had estab-
lished a classic syllogism: facts are described, a rule is set down,
and through the application of reason to both of them, a logical
result is achieved.
Of final consideration is the precise nature of this mediator
called reason. St. German described reason as "the participation or
knowledge of eternal law in a rational creature";50 Fortescue pic-
tured it as "a force of the mind partaking of divine light" by which
the "Truth of Justice" is revealed.5'
Although God initially bestowed reason upon man, this natu-
ral faculty could be improved by human education and instruc-
tion.5 2 Through this process of improvement, common-law lawyers
acquired what Coke called "the life of the Law. . .which is to be
understood of an artificiale perfection of reason gotten by long
studie, observation and experience and not of every mans naturale
reason, for nemo nascitur artifex."3 Thus, while common-law rea-
49. Y.B. Pasch. 21 Hen. 7, f. 20, pl. 2 (1506).
50. 91 SELDEN SOCIETY, DOCTOR AND STUDENT, supra note 14, at 13 (italics deleted).
51. J. FORTESCUE, DE NATURA, supra note 16, at 224-25.
52. R. HOOKER, supra note 33, at 168; see also J. FoRTEscuE, DE NATURA, supra note
16, at 243; 91 SELDEN SociETY, DOCTOR AND STUDENT, supra note 14, at 27.
53. 1 E. COKE, supra note 18, § 138, at 97b.
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son may have had its roots in divine inspiration, its finished state
was very much the product of man's own skilled craft. 4
Only an elite few were capable of using this carefully honed
tool. As the Chancellor explained to the Prince in De Laudibus,
[I]t will not be expedient for you to investigate precise points of
the law by the exertion of your own reason, but these should be
left to your judges and advocates who in the kingdom of Eng-
land are called serjeants-at-law, and also to others skilled in the
law who are commonly called apprentices."
In those essential causes that concerned the life, inheritance,
goods, or fortunes of Englishmen, it was the artificial reason of the
Justices and Serjeants of the royal courts, not the natural reason
possessed by every man, that dictated the outcome of a case.56
The whole of the common-law system is thus complete;
through extended study, lawyers learned to reason in the highly
technical fashion unique to the central courts. They called this ar-
tifical reason into play whenever a procedural rule of these courts
threatened to infringe upon basic substantive rights. The contin-
ued practice of this discipline "by an infinite number of grave and
learned men '5 7 gave birth to the common law of England.
III. THE APPLICATION OF NATURAL LAW
In the epilogue to his Tenures, Littleton admonished his son
not to accept his treatise as law. Rather, he should use it as a tool
for understanding the arguments of the law, "[flor by the Argu-
ments and Reasons in the Law, a man more sooner shall come to
the certaintie and knowledge of the Law."" Littleton and his con-
54. Coke's decision to describe reason as "artifically" perfected by human effort was not
fortuitous. In 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 473 (definition I(1)) "artifi-
cial" is defined as "not natural." "Artificial" is further defined as "[d]isplaying much skill,"
id. (definition 11(6)); "education or training; scholarly," id. (definition 11(7)); and "technical
skill," id. (definition 11(8)). The author wishes to thank Ms. Shirley Guthrie for bringing
this point to her attention.
55. J. FoRTEscuE, DE LAUDIBUS, supra note 15, at 23. Similarly, Hooker argued that
because human laws are of the utmost importance to the preservation of society, only wise
men should be allowed to make them, for "men of common capacity and but ordinary judg-
ment are not capable . . . to discern what things are fittest for each kind and state of regi-
ment." R. HOOKER, supra note 33, at 193.
56. Prohibitions Del Roy, 12 Co. 64, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342 (K.B. 1607).
57. 1 E. COKE, supra note 18, § 138, at 976.
58. 2 id. at 394b-95. Coke approved of this statement and remarked, "And well doth
our author [Littleton] couple arguments and reasons together, Quia argumenta ignota &
obscura ad lucem rationis proferunt & reddunt splendida: and therefore argumentari & rati-
ocinari are many times taken for one." He went on to cite Y.B. Mich. 11 Hen. 4, f. 34, pl. 66
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temporaries were able to observe these arguments firsthand in
court; however, modern lawyers must be content to view them
through the reports of others. Nevertheless, the Year Book cases
can provide us with valuable insights into this reason that Coke
called the "soul of the common law."'59
A. Due Process
In keeping with the procedural theme of the Year Books in
general, and the Year Book cases that specifically invoked reason
in particular, the most popular concern of common-law reason was
due process: "[Flor when a man is charged in the course of the law,
he will not be charged without notice by due process against him
according to the order of the law." 60
The threshhold question in any case involving due process of
law is whether the court hearing the cause has-proper jurisdiction.
Thus, when the Chancellor issued a subpoena in 1460 regarding
goods forfeited to the King for high treason, Jenny claimed that it
was not reasonable to allow Chancery to issue a subpoena when an
adequate remedy, detinue, existed in the common-law courts."
A 1460 case argued in the Informal Exchequer Chamber
voiced a similar concern for the sanctity of common-law jurisdic-
tion. Maintaining that a prohibition should lie against spiritual
court suits of laesio fidei for a money debt or land conveyance,
Fortescue argued:
[T]his suit is in a way to compel the party to perform an act
that touches the King's court, and the conusance of this belongs
to the King's court, and not to the other. Thus, to punish a
party for laesio fidei for a thing within the conusance of the
King's court ... would be against reason.2
(1409), in which Chief Judge Hankford remarked, "Home ne scavera de quel mettal un corn-
pane est, si ne soit bien bate, ne le ley bien conus sans disputation." See also Y.B. Trin. 11
Hen. 7, f. 24, pl. 2 (1496) (per Vavisour) ("the common law is argued by reason").
59. 2 E. COKE, supra note 18, at 395.
60. Y.B. Mich. 8 Edw. 4, f. 9, pl. 9 at f. 11 (1468).
61. Y.B. Mich. 39 Hen. 6, f. 26, pl. 36 (1460). The court eventually held the subpoena
good, probably because of the King's interest in the outcome.
62. Y.B. Pasch. 38 Hen. 6, f. 29, pl. 11 (1460). Littleton expressed similar jealousy in a
case of trespass for wheat taken. The defendant claimed that the taking was for tithes and,
therefore, within the jurisdiction of the spiritual court. Littleton, however, argued that the
common-law court had jurisdiction by reason of an additional claim for assault and battery.
Otherwise, "the court can be ousted of jurisdiction if an action is brought by the plaintiff's
servant against the defendant's because the debate was over tithes, which would be against
reason." Y.B. Mich. 35 Hen. 6, f. 39, pl. 47 (1456).
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The common-law courts jealously guarded their exclusive ju-
risdiction under the rubric of reason. But even the justices of the
common law courts sometimes had to relinquish jurisdiction. As
reason surely would dictate, it was not wise to cross the King-or
so the justices thought when faced with the King's privy seal in
1464."s Thomas Sherwood was charged and convicted of trespass.
The court awarded the plaintiff capias pro fine judgment and an
exigent. After Sherwood had been exacted in two or three counties
and previously convicted of redisseisin, the King sent his privy seal
to the justices, instructing them to issue a supersedeas to the sher-
iff ordering him to cease process. Croxton, the clerk of the King's
Bench, recited to the court an example from the reign of Henry VI,
in which Fortescue as Chief Justice told his brothers he did not
wish to obey a similar privy seal. His brothers answered, "[Wle
ought to do as reason and conscience counsel us.""64 Croxton agreed
that reason and conscience were the correct guides in this situa-
tion, but to him that meant rendering judgment according to pre-
cedent. Because Chief Justice Markham, who was more familiar
with these matters, was not present in court, Croxton asked to
have the matter deferred until Markham could come and express
his "reason and conscience."" Markham was present the following
term, and after applying his superior reason, awarded the superse-
deas to Thomas Sherwood."
Once the court establishes proper jurisdiction, basic due pro-
cess requires that a man not be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without a fair trial, in which he is provided with adequate op-
portunity to present his side of the case. Reason clearly protected
life, as a 1482 appeal of robbery in the King's Bench illustrates. 7
After the defendant pleaded not guilty, the plaintiff's counsel,
Lovell, attempted to oust the defendant of battle by producing an
indictment. The defendant challenged the indictment as void,
thereby admitting the appeal to be good. Lovell then asked to im-
parl. Fairfax refused to allow the plaintiff's request, claiming it
would be against reason to allow the plaintiff to imparl when the
defendant by his plea had put his very life in jeopardy."
63. Y.B. Pasch. 4 Edw. 4, f. 19, pl. 36 (1464).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Y.B. Trin. 4 Edw. 4, f. 21, pl. 4 (1464).
67. Y.B. Trin. 22 Edw. 4, f. 19, pl. 46 (1482) (plaintiff accused defendant of stealing a
leather purse worth 4d).
68. Y.B. Trin. 22 Edw. 4, f. 19, pl. 46 (1482).
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A 1467 action of replevin that reached the Exchequer Cham-
ber demonstrated that reason also favored a man's personal lib-
erty. 9 The parties had originally joined issue on whether the de-
fendant, the Prior of Dunstable, was seised of certain lands. On the
day of venire facias, however, the defendant claimed that the
plaintiff had been outlawed at the suit of one J. atte Stile by the
name of W.D. of the county of H, husbandman. The plaintiff de-
nied the outlawry and claimed to be a yeoman. Issue was joined on
the latter point; during the pendency of that plea, however, the
plaintiff was taken by capias utlagatum by force of the same out-
lawry. He again denied that he was a husbandman, and scire facias
issued to J. atte Stile, who defaulted. The King's attorney came
and disputed whether W.D. was a husbandman. Upon a jury find-
ing that W.D. was a yeoman, the court discharged him of the out-
lawry charge.
The question of whether the defendant could ask to have the
question of yeoman or husbandman tried was put to the Excheq-
uer Chamber. Although Jenny was of the opinion that the defen-
dant should not be estopped by a matter to which he was not a
party (a legitimate due process concern), Catesby forcefully argued
against the defendant's request. The issue should not now be tried,
Catesby reasoned, because it might be found to the contrary of the
previous judgment, thereby leaving the plaintiff open to new
charges of outlawry. According to Catesby, reason dictated that
once discharged of outlawry, a man should not be subject to retrial
on the same issue; that is, his freedom should not be put in jeop-
ardy twice.
Consistent with the property orientation of the medieval En-
glish system,70 the courts often invoked reason to protect property
rights. In a 1482 case, Rotheram, then Archbishop of York and
Chancellor of England, asked the assembled members of the Infor-
mal Exchequer Chamber whether he should grant a subpoena to a
man bound by a statute merchant who had paid the debt due, but
had not obtained a release from the recognizee.7 ' Hussey, Chief
Justice of the King's Bench, maintained that the subpoena should
69. Y.B. Pasch. 7 Edw. 4, f. 1, pl. 3 (1467). The court voiced a similar concern for
double recovery in Y.B. Hil. 3 Edw. 4, f. 28, pl. 3 (1464), in which several of the justices
maintained that it would be "inconvenient and impertinent" to demand the same thing
twice in divers counties.
70. St. German went so far as to equate his law of reason secondary general with the
law or general custom of property. 91 SELDEN SociETY, DOCTOR AND STUDENT, supra note 14,
at 33.
71. Y.B. Pasch. 22 Edw. 4, f. 6, pl. 18 (1482).
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not issue and offered as proof a case heard before the whole court
some thirty years earlier. In that case the court agreed that a sub-
poena would not lie if a man had enfeoffed another in trust and
had then died seised, so that his (the feoffor's) heir was in by de-
scent. This was great reason, Hussey argued, for if one descent
could be disproved in Chancery by only two witnesses, then so too
could twenty descents, "which is against reason and conscience.'71
The English courts also invoked reason to protect the property
rights of petty jurors faced with a writ of attaint. In one action a
petty juror attempted to raise an accord made between the plain-
tiff and the defendant in regard to the original writ of trespass. 8
Although the plaintiff's counsel argued that the accord was not a
matter of record and, therefore, could not be pleaded against a
judgment of record, the counsel for the petty juror declared that
"the law is not so unreasonable as to punish the petty jury ....
Thus, it is reason that they have such pleas as proven the plaintiff
did not have a cause of action. '74 Of foremost concern to both this
petty juror and his counsel was the stiff penalty of forfeiture of
property that accompanied a conviction of attaint.
Reason similarly protected personal property rights. In a 1455
action of trespass de bonis asportatis, the defendant pleaded that
he had purchased the goods in market overt . 5 Laicon considered
the scope of the market overt rule and determined that the bona-
fide purchaser should be protected. But a purchaser with notice
should not be so favored, "for otherwise men could rob one an-
other, and by agreement with an incontinent stranger sell them in
the same market, thus divesting the property from the rightful
owner forever, which would be against reason. ' 76 Reason, then,
governed the rules of the central courts, ensuring that they did not
unduly infringe upon man's most precious rights-life, liberty, and
property.
Reason also protected the second half of the due process equa-
72. Id. The rights of tenants in common to partition or sever their holdings, either by
deed or on the land, is also protected by reason because they hold both jointly and severally
and, therefore, have separate, identifiable interests. Joint tenants are not similarly protected
because they hold jointly but not severally. Y.B. Mich. 3 Edw. 4, f. 8, pl. 1 (1463).
73. Y.B. Mich. 13 Edw. 4, f. 5, pl. 14 (1473).
74. Id.
75. Y.B. Hil. 33 Hen. 6, f. 5, pl. 15 (1455).
76. Id. See, e.g., Y.B. Mich. 34 Hen. 6, f. 22, pl. 42 at f. 24 (1455), in which Prisot
maintained that it would be against reason to subject the executor's goods to execution in
debt where the testator's goods were insufficient. But see cases cited infra note 95 (recovery
extended to executors' goods).
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tion: the right to a fair trial. Essential to the preservation of a fair
trial is adequate notice throughout the proceedings. As Fairfax ar-
gued in a 1468 arbitration case, to charge a man without notice
would be to subject him to "great mischief," and that would be
against reason.77 The mischiefs that would ensue are several. First,
without notice a defendant could not plead properly. Thus, accord-
ing to Moile, it was reason that the conditions indorsed on the
back of an obligation be read in court.78 Second, the plaintiff, be-
cause he instituted the action, was already at an advantage, espe-
cially when he had a written obligation as proof of his claim. Con-
sequently, Markham believed that reason and conscience 79
compelled the obligee to give notice to the obligor if the former
wished to bind the latter to performance.80 Third, the defendant
stood to suffer serious loss in the form of amercements or fines if
the action went against him. It was not reason, then, that the
plaintiff be allowed to recover if the defendant did not have notice
of the suit.81
Equally crucial to a fair trial is a proper mode of proof. Rea-
son controlled the choice between wager and jury for "by reason all
that lies within the notice of the country will be tried by the coun-
try if the party wishes." '82 Reason also regulated the place from
which a jury panel was drawn, as a 1465 action demonstrates.8
The plaintiff sued a London executor on an obligation made in
Cornwall; "common right and reason" ' dictated that the cause
77. Y.B. Mich. 8 Edw. 4, f. 9, pl. 9 at f. 11 (1468). The Year Books often recognized
mischief as the antithesis of reason. See, e.g., Y.B. Mich. 5 Edw. 4, f. 109, pl. 83 (Long
Quinto) (1465); Y.B. Mich. 38 Hen. 6, f. 2, pl. 15 (1459); Y.B. Hil. 33 Hen. 6, f. 5, pl. 15
(1455).
78. Y.B. Mich. 38 Hen. 6, f. 2, pl. 5 (1459).
79. The Year Books often coupled conscience and reason. See, e.g., Y.B. Pasch. 22 Edw.
4, f. 6, pl. 18 (1482); Y.B. Pasch. 21 Edw. 4, f. 24, pl. 10 (1481); Y.B. Pasch. 4 Edw. 4, f. 19,
pl. 36 (1464).
80. Y.B. Pasch. 8 Edw. 4, f. 1, pl. 1 at f. 2 (1468). Catesby and Pigot (and later Choke)
maintained in this case that although notice is required to bind a man in law, he can by
contract (e.g., through agency agreement) bind himself to perform without notice. Note also
that Danby believed that arbitors, as distinguished from plaintiffs, did not need to give
notice because arbitors have only a charge and no advantage. Id.
81. Id.
82. Y.B. Hil. 33 Hen. 6, f. 7, pl. 23 at f. 8 (1455). In this challenge to a summons in a
praecipe quod reddat, Danvers also favored the jury, though for different reasons. It would
be against reason, Danvers argued, to compel a man to wage his law, which must be done in
person, at a place (Westminster) to which he could not come.
83. Y.B. Trin. 5 Edw. 4, f. 55, pl. 47 (Long Quinto) (1465).
84. "Common right" and "reason" often complimented each other. See, e.g., Y.B.
Pasch. 21 Hen. 7, f. 20, pl. 2 (1506) (per Kingamill and Fisher); Y.B. Hil. 14 Hen. 7, f. 17, pl.
7 at f. 19 (1499) (per Davers); Y.B. Mich. 2 Rich. 3, f. 15, pl. 42 at f. 16 (1484) (per
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should be tried wherever the court found the best knowledge of
and familiarity with the matter.8
The word "fair" also conjures up notions of good faith reliance
and mitigating factors. Good faith reliance upon matters of record
figured into several Year Book cases from the mid-fifteenth cen-
tury. One such case involved a writ of annuity brought against a
parson.86 After the plaintiff claimed title by prescription, the de-
fendant prayed aid of the patron and the ordinary, both of whom
defaulted. Title was found for the plaintiff. The parson then died,
and the plaintiff sought execution against his successor, who again
prayed aid of the patron and the ordinary. The patron once again
defaulted, but this. time the ordinary came, claiming that all the
original jurors were dead and traversing the plaintiff's title, The
plaintiff demurred. Fortescue favored the plea, claiming that, be-
cause the death of the jurors rendered attaint impossible, it would
be reason to reopen the record. Yelverton strongly disagreed,
arguing:
By this reason a right recovered in an action can never take ef-
fect; for by this reason where a recovery is tailed against my an-
cestor by an action tried perhaps one hundred years ago, and
the jurors are now dead, I will be allowed to challenge the record
on the point that was tried, which is not law or reason.8 7
The self-evident nature of written matter clearly impressed
the lawyers of the central courts. But even the most conservative
of these lawyers must have been aware of the need to mitigate the
unnecessary harm that sometimes arose when the plain words of a
writing collided with impossible or absurd performance. Markham
addressed this question during the course of a lengthy arbitration
case. 8 According to Markham it was common course to allow
mainpernors to allege the defendant's death to escape liability:
"for the bond will not be taken so strictly; rather, in each bond is a
reason."8 9 Further, Markham argued, if a man agrees in writing to
Vavisour); Y.B. Mich. 34 Hen. 6, f. 15, pl. 28 (1457) (per Littleton).
85. Y.B. Trin. 5 Edw. 4, f. 55, pl. 47 (Long Quinto) (1465).
86. Y.B. Mich. 22 Hen. 6, f. 28, pl. 47 [listed as pl. 421 (1443).
87. Id. See also Y.B. Mich. 13 Edw. 4, f. 5, pl. 14 (1473), in which counsel for the plain-
tiff argued that because an accord is not a matter of record, it could not be pleaded against
a judgment of record; Y.B. Pasch. 7 Edw. 4, f. 1, pl. 3 (1467), in which Catesby also consid-
ered a request to retry an issue. "It seems to me," Catesby declared, "that the prior ... will
be bound by the matter found between the King and the plaintiff, for otherwise great incon-
venience would ensue." Id.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 77-81.
89. Y.B. Mich. 8 Edw. 4, f. 20, pl. 35 at f. 21 (1468). In an earlier portion of the report,
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deliver twenty quarters of wheat, he need not carry it around eve-
rywhere. Rather, it is sufficient that he inform the buyer that the
wheat will be delivered wherever he designates, "and so in each
bond reason will aid."90 By incorporating concepts of notice and
mitigating circumstances, reason thereby ensured a fair and just
trial for all.
Inextricably intertwined with the process of the central courts
was the medieval version of precedent.91 While some medieval En-
glish lawyers did go so far as to argue that "precedents in a court
make a law," 2 the majority tended to recognize precedent only
when it suited their needs. By invoking reason, these lawyers were
able to square their genuine respect for the past with their seem-
ingly casual disregard for cases decided in their very own court.
At the outset, if no precedent either existed or was cited by
counsel, the court would adjudge according to law and reason,93
and thereby make its own precedent. 94 When a party did proffer
precedent in court, the Justices felt a certain compulsion to follow
it. As Croxton explained,
It is not honorable for us or for this court or any other court to
vary our judgments, as to give judgment in a matter in one term,
and later in another term in another matter, or even in the same
matter, different judgment. Therefore we wish to give judgment
now as we have given before in like matters. And that is what I
believe reason and conscience to be.9"
Starkey also argued against taking deeds too strictly. Y.B. Mich. 8 Edw. 4, f. 9, pl. 9 at f. 12
(1468). See also Y.B. Mich. 27 Hen. 8, f. 14, pl. 6 at f. 18 (1535), in which Chancellor Audley
maintained that "the law in its reasonableness will expound the parties' intent by their
words."
90. Y.B. Mich. 8 Edw. 4, f. 20, pl. 35 at f. 21 (1468). See also Y.B. Pasch. 7 Edw. 4, f. 4,
pl. 10 (1467), in which Littleton advanced a similar situation:
I pose that if I were obligated to you for £20 on condition that I pay £10 on St.
John Baptist's feast (24 June), and I come to you on Pentecost (seventh Sunday
after Easter) and tender the said £10 and you refuse, now if the penalty is not
saved by this tender, I will be forced to go to you every day until St. John Bap-
tist's day, which would be against reason.
Id.
91. For a comprehensive treatment of the role of precedent in the medieval common
law, see C. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 236-382 (7th ed. 1964); Lewis, The History of Judi-
cial Precedent (pts. 1 & 2), 46 L.Q. REv. 207, 341 (1930), (pt. 3), 47 L.Q. REv. 411 (1931).
92. Y.B. Mich. 5 Edw. 4, f. 109, pl. 83 (Long Quinto) (1465). But in the same case the
court also claimed that "two or three precedents are neither custom nor law," and that "in
divers cases precedents do not make law." Id. at f. 110.
93. Y.B. Mich. 5 Edw. 4, f. 109, pl. 83 at f. 110 (Long Quinto) (1465); see also Y.B.
Pasch. 38 Hen. 6, f. 30, pl. 12 (1460) (Fortescue makes a similar comment).
94. Y.B. Mich. 5 Edw. 4, f. 137, pl. 107 (Long Quinto) (1465).
95. Y.B. Pasch. 4 Edw. 4, f. 19, pl. 36 (1464). See also Y.B. Trin. 14 Hen. 7, f. 28, pl. 3 at
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According to Prisot, adherence to precedent made for certainty in
the courts:
If this is now adjudged no plea ... this will be a bad example
for the young apprentices who are studying in terms, for they
will no longer give credence to their books if such a judgment
that has often times been adjudged in our books is now adjudg-
ed to the contrary."
The importance of predictability notwithstanding, most jus-
tices refused to follow precedent that they thought clearly wrong. 7
Rather, if a precedent appeared to be against reason, then the
court would amend- it, "for perhaps this [precedent] had been suf-
fered before but never challenged or debated."98 Furthermore, the
demands imposed upon the law changed with the times. Reason
helped the court to recognize precisely when precedent needed to
be modified. In a plea of deceit heard in the Exchequer Chamber,9'
Moile considered whether damages were recoverable against a
sheriff for a false return. Although certain precedent dictated a
negative answer, Moile nevertheless believed that he and his
brothers could change the rule. With a perfunctory bow to prece-
dent, he cited several examples in which similar changes had been
wrought,100 and then declared that "since Justices before today
have changed by cause of better reason, why cannot we, too?"101
The justices also called upon reason when faced with conflict-
f. 29 (1499), in which Vavisour declared that "such a judgment has often been in our books
and [was] adjudged in the time of Henry 6. Therefore it is not good reason-nor do we
wish-to change it." Fortescue exhibited a similar sentiment in a case concerning the scope
of recovery against executors. Had this been a case of first impression, he explained, he
would have favored limiting recovery to the testator's goods. But because there were so
many judgments extending recovery to the executor's goods, he felt bound without any
other reason to follow them. Y.B. Mich. 34 Hen. 6, f. 22, pl. 42 at f. 24 (1455).
96. Y.B. Mich. 33 Hen. 6, f. 38, pl. 17 at f. 41 (1454). See also Y.B. Trin. 27 Hen. 8, f.
23, pl. 21 (1535), in which Fitzherbert exclaimed, "put that case out of your books, for with-
out a doubt it is not law."
97. See, e.g., Y.B. Trin. 22 Edw. 4, f. 19, pl. 46 (1482) (per Fairfax); Y.B. Pasch. 5 Edw.
4, f. 6, pl. 9 at f. 8 (Long Quinto) (1465) (per Littleton).
98. Y.B. Mich. 5 Edw. 4, f. 109, pl. 83 (Long Quinto) (1465); see Y.B. Mich. 34 Hen. 6, f.
22, pl. 42 at f. 24 (1455) (similar comment by Fortescue).
99. Y.B. Mich. 5 Edw. 4, f. 93, pl. 71 (Long Quinto) (1465).
100. He gave as examples the Statute of Westminister II, 13 Edw. 1, ch. 14 (1285),
which reformed the writ of waste used by the remainderman, and the fact that while for-
merly heirs could bring debt, at the time he spoke the law no longer recognized their action.
Y.B. Mich. 5 Edw. 4, f. 93, pl. 71 at f. 99 (1465).
101. Id. But see Y.B. Hil. 4 Edw. 4, f. 43, pl. 4 (1465), in which Markham reluctantly
declared that "if that is the form, then this course becomes law even though reason may not
dictate to the contrary."
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ing precedents. In a 1443 action of praecipe quod reddat, Mark-
ham, acting for the tenant, demanded the view.102 Port, however,
claimed that the view previously had been awarded to this tenant
in a similar writ brought against the tenant and his wife, which
had been abated when the wife died. After both counsel cited nu-
merous cases for their sides, Port finally declared that "since there
are divers judgments given in this matter before this time, it is
best to determine of reason what should be done."' 0 3
Unfortunately, submitting divers precedents to reason could
create even more problems than it solved, for common-law reason
was a chameleon, changing colors according to the viewpoint of the
lawyer who currently invoked it. In a 1493 appeal of death,0 4 the
question was whether the defendant, who had been outlawed but
subsequently had obtained the King's pardon, could bar the appel-
lor from execution without showing a written release of some sort.
Vavisour tangled with Hussey, who claimed to have the support of
the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas for his position that the
pardon did not require a writing. Vavisour retorted that, as far as
he could determine, the reason of his books, which held to the con-
trary, was far superior to their opinion. 0 5
In the end, it is not surprising to find reason so malleable.
Common-law reason was not an eternal constant; rather, it de-
pended primarily upon the activity of the human mind, no two of
which are ever alike.
0 6
B. Custom
Medieval justices often used reasons to determine the force of
local customs in the central courts.10 7 Customs draw their force
from the mutual consent of all those bound,1'0 and consent can be
proven by long, unchallenged usage.1'0 To Littleton, this undis-
turbed usage from time immemorial was the very essence of the
common law, for "by prescription, we have all our law, except for
102. Y.B. Pasch. 21 Hen. 6, f. 42, pl. 19 (1443).
103. Id. The court eventually granted the view.
104. Y.B. Mich. 9 Hen. 7, f. 5, pl. 1 (1493).
105. Id. at f. 6.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 40-57.
107. For contemporary scholarship on the subject, see C. ALLEN, supra note 91, at 67-
160; P. VINOGRADOFF, CUSTOM AND RIGHT (1925).
108. According to St. German, general customs must "haue ben acceptyd and approuyd
by our soueraygne lorde the Kynge and his progenytours and all theyr subgettes." 91 S.-
DEN SOCIETY, DOCTOR AND STUDENT, supra note 14, at 45.
109. P. VINOGRADOFF, supra note 107, at 34.
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things done by special laws such as statutes." 110
St. German divided customs into two sorts: First, general cus-
toms, including primogeniture and coverture, which are used
throughout the realm and are determined by the judge rather than
by the jury;"' second, particular customs, such as Gavelkind and
Borough English, which are used only locally and are proved by
jury rather than by judge.112 Littleton also divided customs into
two kinds, though he used slightly different criteria: those that
were part of the common law (and therefore, binding in all courts)
and those that were not (and thus, binding only locally). " Lit-
tleton explained that Gavelkind and Borough English would be en-
forced in all courts,
because they are customs and usages in the country between
people outside the court, but customs and usages that take ef-
fect in the court where the custom or usage is and that gain
force there ... are not allowable except in the same court, city
or borough where such customs are used.1
14
Although St. German and Littleton managed to place Gavel-
kind on opposite sides of the boundary separating local from gen-
eral custom, in the final analysis they drew the same distinction.
The "general" customs of which they spoke corresponded to the
common-law rules of the central courts. These rules could be con-
sidered customary or prescriptive because they were unwritten 15
and of time-honored usage.110
110. Y.B. Mich. 33 Hen. 6, f. 46, pl. 28 at f. 46 (1454). Coke saw three grounds of the
law of England: the common law, statutes, and particular customs (vis-A-vis general cus-
toms, which are the common law). 1 E. CoKEs, supra note 18, at 115b. As noted above, St.
German saw six such grounds, including both general and particular customs. See supra
note 41 and accompanying text.
111. 91 SELDEN SocI-rv, DOCTOR AND STUDENT, supra note 14, at 45.
112. Id. at 71. Chancellor Rotheram confirmed that a jury was the proper method of
proof for local customs. Y.B. Pasch. 21 Edw. 4, f. 24, pl. 10 (1481) (scope of Kentish custom
allowing a minor to sell his lands at the age of fifteen to be determined by men of Kent).
113. Y.B. Mich. 1 Edw. 4, f. 5, pl. 13 at f. 6 (1461).
114. Id.
115. J. FoRTEscuE, DE NATURA, supra note 16, at 222; 91 SELDEN SocIrrY, DOCTOR AND
STUDENT, supra note 14, at 57.
116. Catesby thought the common law had existed since the beginning of the world.
Y.B. Pasch. 10 Edw. 4, f. 4, pl. 9 (1470). Fortescue placed its conception slightly later, with
the appearance of the Britons in England. J. FoRTEscuz, Ds LAUDIBUS, supra note 15, at 39.
Coke merely saw it as being "the most antient" of laws. 1 E. COKE, supra note 18, at 97b.
These lawyers trumpeted the extreme antiquity of the common law to prove that the En-
glish law was the oldest, most established, and therefore, the best system of law. Yet even
Coke was quick to admit that the common law was not entirely static, but instead under-
went a constant process of refinement. Id.
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The nature of royal court rules differed greatly from particular
customs, which were conventions that arose in the context of dis-
creet local communities, rather than the central courts. Yet, a cus-
tom like Gavelkind, which began on a local level, actually could be
drawn up into the central courts whenever the common-law law-
yers thought it expedient. Once there, the particular custom be-
came common law. 117
Custom could not become part of the common law, however,
unless and until it stood with reason.1"' Customs such as Borough
English, which contradicted basic common-law rules, could thus be
recognized as long as the dictates of reason were met.'1 9 But cus-
toms that could not satisfy reason fell to the level of "bad us-
age, ' ' 20 and not even confirmation by Parliament in statutory form
could save them in the eyes of common-law lawyers."1
Reason, then, controlled the fate of many a customary claim
that managed to work its way up from the countryside to the cen-
tral courts. When brought to bear upon these local customs, reason
exhibited its characteristic concern for reasonable property expec-
tations.1 2 2 A 1468 action of trespass for digging in the plaintiff's
land proves the point.12 8 In that case the defendant justified his
activities by relying upon a Kentish custom that allowed persons
fishing on the seashore to dig in adjoining lands and pitch stakes to
enable them to suspend their nets for drying. Littleton argued that
the custom was against reason, "for if a man has a meadow adjoin-
ing the sea, they can by this custom destroy the whole meadow."12 4
117. Y.B. Mich. 8 Edw. 4, f. 18, pl. 30 at f. 19 (1468) (per Littleton). But see Y.B. Mich.
22 Hen. 6, f. 21, pl. 38 (1443), in which Prisot curiously remarked, "it appears that the said
matter [action of trespass based upon the innkeeper's rule] lies in custom, which will not be
understood to be common law." Newton, however, quickly put Prisot in his place by re-
torting, "What is [more] custom of the land than the law of the land?" Id.
118. See, e.g., Y.B. Mich. 2 Rich. 3, f. 15, pl. 42 at f. 16 (1484); Y.B. Mich. 21 Edw. 4, f.
67, pl. 50 (1481); Y.B. Mich. 8 Edw. 4, f. 18, pl. 30 (1468); Y.B. Mich. 35 Hen. 6, f. 25, pl. 33
(1456); Y.B. Mich. 34 Hen. 6, f. 15, pl. 28 (1455). St. German also believed that custom
always must accord with reason. 91 SELDEN SociETY, DOCTOR AND STUDENT, supra note 14,
at 45, 71.
119. Y.B. Pasch. 12 Hen. 7, f. 15, pl. 1 at f. 16 (1497) (Yaxley commenting on Borough
English); see also Y.B. Mich. 34 Hen. 6, f. 25, pl. 33 (1455) (per Needham).
120. Y.B. Mich. 21 Edw. 4, f. 67, pl. 50 (1481) (per Brian).
121. Id. Yet Fortescue believed that reduction to writing by the monarch's power and
assent would change custom into statute, thereby giving it at least some added measure of
authority. J. FoRTESCUE, Da LAUDIBUS, supra note 15, at 37; J. FORTESCUE, DE NATURA,
supra note 16, at 222-23.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76.
123. Y.B. Mich. 8 Edw. 4, f. 18, pl. 30 (1468).
124. Id. at f. 19. Danby justified the Kentish custom because the fishing was for the
sustenance of the whole realm and thus, the good of the common weal. Nevertheless, Fairfax
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Reason also condemned pleas based on local customs that cre-
ated new property-related rights, unless there was some overriding
justification for the new rights. For example, in a 1506 case involv-
ing a tenant who had distrained animals damagefeasant, the court
refused to allow the lord's avowry, which was based on the lord's
customary right to have all such animals imparked in his own
pond.12 The court denied the lord this additional manorial inci-
dent because the tenant's use of his own park did not injure the
lord, and because the tenant might have been hampered in the
protection of his tenure if he could not distrain trespassing ani-
mals.1 2 6 Reason, however, saw the custom of Borough English in a
different light. Because it was designed to protect the youngest
son, who is less able to care for himself, this custom was consistent
with reason-even though it clearly interfered with the eldest son's
common-law right of primogeniture. 
27
The English courts also protected personal property from un-
reasonable customs. In 1455 the justices of both Benches and the
Barons of the Exchequer sitting in the Informal Exchequer Cham-
ber heard information concerning the possession of certain royal
jewels.12 8 The defendant justified his possession on the basis of a
London custom that permitted the receiver of pledged goods to
keep them until his debt was satisfied. Choke argued that the cus-
tom was not consistent with reason because, as pleaded, it allowed
a man to pledge someone else's goods even though they were not in
his (the pledgor's) possession. Because the custom prejudiced the
owner of the goods, it could not be good. " '
Local custom that created a conflict between real and personal
property rights also came under the scrutiny of reason. In a 1484
action of trespass for swans taken, the defendant-property owner
justified the taking in part on the basis of a Buckinghamshire cus-
maintained that the common weal must not be allowed to destroy a man's inheritance.
125. Y.B. Pasch. 21 Hen. 7, f. 20, pl. 2 (1506).
126. Id.
127. Y.B. Pasch. 12 Hen. 7, f. 15, pl. 1 at f. 16 (1497) (per Yaxley); Y.B. Mich. 8 Edw. 4,
f. 18, pl. 30 at f. 19 (1468) (per Littleton); Y.B. Mich. 35 Hen. 6, f. 25, pl. 33 at f. 26 (1455)
(per Littleton).
128. Y.B. Mich. 35 Hen. 6, f. 25, pl. 33 (1455).
129. Id. Billing also believed a custom that allowed a man to pledge the goods of a
stranger to be against reason. Wangford, however, contended that the custom accorded with
reason, "for when a man possesses certain goods, how can aman know in whom the prop-
erty is if not in he who possesses them?" Id. at f. 27.
Hengston labeled unreasonable the London custom allowing a villein who lived peace-
fully in London for one year to go free since it prejudiced the owner, to whom the villein was
an inheritance. Id.
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tom: for each swan that came ashore to nest from Buckingham-
shire waters flowing into the Thames, the swan's owner was to
have the first two of the offspring and the adjoining property own-
er the third. 30 Vavisour thought the custom unreasonable because
it allowed the landowner to take and to occupy someone else's ani-
mals. But Fairfax saw the custom as reasonable, because it took
into account "the trouble" that the landowner suffered by allowing
the swans to nest on his free tenement."' Although resolution of
the case was not reported, one can speculate that in medieval Eng-
land, reason would favor the free tenement argument over the
chattel.
C. Statutory Interpretation
On occasion, courts used reason to interpret statutes. Al-
though Coke's famous dictum in Dr. Bonham's Case"s' (that when
an act of Parliament is against common right and reason, it will be
adjudged void) lay in the future, medieval English judges did en-
gage in statutory interpretation by applying the doctrine of the eq-
uity of a statute."' In a 1457 Exchequer Chamber discussion" of
the scope of the statute Westminster I,135 the court summoned rea-
son to construe whether the King should have wardship and mar-
riage of a fifteen-year-old female heir of a tenant in chief. Fortes-
cue declared that common reason, always protective of real
property rights, favored wardship until the age of twenty-one for a
male heir of a tenant by knight's service. This rule was necessary
because during his nonage, the heir does not have proper discre-
tion to deal with his inheritance, cannot perform the services due
on the land, and is not able to carry arms in war. Wardship of a
married woman, however, should end at the age of fourteen be-
cause her husband, who may be an adult (that in a given case he
.130. Y.B. Mich. 2 Rich. 3, f. 15, pl. 42 (1484).
131. Id. at f. 16.
132. 8 Co. 113b, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (C.P. 1610).
133. Y.B. Hil. 14 Hen. 7, f. 17, pl. 7 (1499). For Coke's classic explanation of the doc-
trine, see Heydon's Case, 3 Co. 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ex. Ch. 1584). See also Thorne, The
Equity of a Statute and Heydon's Case, 31 ILL. L. REv. 202 (1936).
134. Y.B. Hil. 35 Hen. 6, f. 52, pl. 17 (1457); Y.B. Hil. 35 Hen. 6, f. 40, pl. 2 (1457).
135. The statute provides in pertinent part:
... And of Heirs Female, after they have accomplished the Age of Fourteen
Years, and the Lord (to whom the Marriage belongeth) will not marry them, but
for Covetise of the land will keep them unmarried; it is provided that the Lord
shall not have nor keep, by Reason of Marriage, the Lands of such Heirs Female
more than Two Years after the Term of the said Fourteen Years.
Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 22 (1275).
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was a minor was of no consequence), was capable of performing the
services during their coverture. But Fortescue then argued,
By common reason an unmarried woman will not be adjudged
better in discretion, or wiser, or better able to do the services
due on her land than will a man at fourteen, for by common
presumption a man will be adjudged wiser at fourteen than a
woman of the same age.""6
In Fortescue's opinion, Magna Carta, the Provisions of Merton,
and Westminster I, coupled with common reason, proved that at
common law the age for a man and an unmarried woman should be
the same. Thus, the feme sole had to remain in wardship until six-
teen years of age. 1 7
Courts also cast the light of reason upon procedural questions
raised by statutorily based claims. In a cessavit per biennium for
land and rent," the tenant defaulted, and another came and said
that he was seised in fee and had leased the land and rent to the
tenant for life. The demandant pleaded no lease; the parties joined
issue thereupon, and subsequently the court found for the deman-
dant at nisi prius. The question then was raised as to whether the
demandant's plea was founded on, or permitted by, the Statute of
Westminster 11.139 Hengston argued that although the statute au-
thorized the receipt of the reversioner to protect his tenure, it did
not express the manner in which the reversioner should plead.
Therefore, the pleading should be "according to the course of the
common law, as can be understood by reason."""
Perhaps the most significant statutory-related question to
which reason was applied was the validity of uses. Common-law
lawyers had to consider uses carefully after the Feoffments to Uses
Act of 148314 thrust uses into the central courts by giving the ces-
136. Y.B. Hil. 35 Hen. 6, f. 52, pl. 17 at f. 53 (1457). The author seriously questions the
wisdom of Fortescue's logic here.
137. Id.
138. Y.B. Mich. 33 Hen. 6, f. 38, pl. 17 (1454).
139. The statute provides in pertinent part:
[I]t is agreed that if any with-hold from his Lord his due and accustomed Ser-
vices by Two Years, the Lord shall have an Action to demand the land in de-
mean by such a writ: Praecipe A. quod juste &c. reddat B. tale tenementum
quod A. de eo tenuit per tale servicium, & quod ad praedictum B. reverti debet,
eo quod predictus A. in faciendo praedictum servitium, per biennium cessavit, ut
dicitur.
Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw. 1, ch. 21 (1285).
140. Y.B. Mich. 33 Hen. 6, f. 38, pl. 17 at f. 39 (1454).
141. [Ble it ordained ... that every estate feoffment, gift, release, grant, leases
and confirmations of lands, tenemants, rents, services, or hereditaments, made
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tui que use the right to convey the legal estate. The question was
debated thoroughly in a 1521 case of replevin"1 2 brought by one
J.S. The defendant avowed the taking on the grounds that J.D.
and J.B. had been seised of one carucate of land to the use of R.N.,
and so seised, they granted an annual rent charge issuing there-
from to Alice, R's wife, for life. Alice then married the defendant
and he distrained for rent in arrears. The plaintiff answered that
J.D. and J.B. had been seised to the use of W.N. and had granted
the rent to Alice as alleged, with Alice having notice of the use.
After J.D. and J.B. had enfeoffed Halpenny in fee, W.N. released
all his right to Halpenny. Willoughby demurred for the defendant,
claiming, among other things, that the plaintiff's plea did not show
how the use arose.
The court next considered the nature of uses, with reason once
again coming to the aid of real property interests. Brown con-
tended that the Feoffments of Uses Act of 1483 was immaterial in
making a use; rather, "it will be according to reason, which is in
the common law."14 Brooke agreed, adding that conscience (that
is, the court of Chancery) also did not make a use. Pollard then
explained that by reason, feoffees to sue are bound to act according
to the trust, for otherwise they would deceive their feoffor, which
would not be reason. 144
Curiously, some thirty years later, the first argument heard in
Lord Dacre's Will 45 enthusiastically repeated these same argu-
ments in favor of the reasonableness of uses. York echoed Pollard's
contention that a use was a trust and, therefore, must exist at com-
mon law, because "a trust or a confidence is a thing that is very
necessary between two men.""" Common reason, Montague con-
firmed, wills that a man may put his trust in another. In any event,
Montague continued, even if uses truly did not exist at common
law, many inheritances had come to depend upon those trusts, so
that there would be great mischief and confusion (which was surely
or had, or hereafter to be made or had by any person or persons being of full age
'. . shall be good and effectual to him to whom it is so made, had or given ...
Feoffments to Uses Act, 1483, 1 Rich. 3, ch. 1.
142. Y.B. Mich. 14 Hen. 8, f. 4, p. 5 (1521).
143. Id. at f. 5.
144. On several occasions, the court justified the related concept of a devise as reasona-
ble because, as Choke explained, a man should be able to do in death with his realty what
he could do in life. Y.B. Mich. 35 Hen. 6, f. 25, pl. 33 (1455); see also Y.B. Pasch. 21 Edw. 4,
f. 24, pl. 10 (1481) (per Digas, apprentice); Y.B. Mich. 35 Hen. 6, f. 25, pl. 33 at f. 26 (1455)
(per Littleton).
145. Y.B. Pasch. 27 Hen. S, f. 7, pl. 22 (1535).
146. Id. at f. S.
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against reason) should the law now be changed.14 7 The entire dis-
cussion eventually went for naught when, on second hearing, the
justices suddenly declared uses to be against common law.14 8 The
final lesson is obvious: whatever else reason might say, when the
King spoke, reason dictated that the justices listen.
IV. CONCLUSION
Reason truly was the very soul of the common law."1 9 It
watched over the rights most precious to Englishmen and ensured
that the royal courts that enforced those rights ran smoothly.
Through it, the lawyers of common law were able both to preserve
time-honored local custom and to move forward with statutory in-
novation. Finally, and most importantly, while it sprang from a
common seed implanted in all legal-minded Englishmen, reason
bloomed in as many different shades as there were Englishmen.
Lex plus laudatur quando ratione probatur.1 50
147. Id. at f. 10.
148. 93 SELDEN Socigry, SPELMAN'S REPORTS 228, 230 (J. Baker ed. 1977).
149. 2 E. CoKE, supra note 18, at 394b.
150. Id. at 395a. (The law is more praiseworthy when supported by reason.).
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